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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT

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LESSONS LEARNED



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CAM RANH BAY DEPOT (PROV)

CAM RANH BAY

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1 MAY 1966 - 31 JULY 1966

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INTRODUCTION

During the period covered by this report the Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov) was activated and assumed the depot operations of the former US Army Depot. Retaining the directorate concept, which prove effective since its initiation by the 504th QM Depot, the Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov) carried out its assigned mission at a high level of efficiency. The following report is divided into chapters, with each chapter devoted to one of the directorates. This report, also, includes information on some of the activities of the US Army Depot, which was functioning in the early part of the quarter covered by this report. For further information concerning US Army Depot operations, the Cam Ranh Bay Sub Area Command (Prov) Operational Report on Lessons Learned should be consulted.

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CHAPTER I

DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. MISSION:

The mission of the Directorate of Administration is to provide assistance to the Depot Commander in exercising staff supervision for military personnel and administration, and for formulation of policies and exercising staff supervision over the procurement, allocation, promotion, pay, leave, morale and welfare, classification and reclassification, transfer and replacement, administration of the proficiency pay program, and separation and re-deployment of personnel.

B. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

During the month of May 1966, the proposed TD for the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay was refined again and again. When all that remained to complete this TD for submission was typing on the proper forms, we received a copy of a proposed TD which had been prepared at higher headquarters and submitted for all US Army Depots in the 1st Logistical Command. Approximately seven weeks of work on our TD had thus proved to be only a practical exercise of little real value. However, this work did provide an insight into future problems.

On 1 June 1966, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, located at Nha Trang, organized three provisional commands at Cam Ranh Bay: the Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov), the Cam Ranh Bay Port (Prov), and the Cam Ranh Bay Sub Area Command (Prov). On 1 June 1966, Colonel Nathaniel A. Gage, Jr. arrived to assume command of the Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov). Colonel Alfred H. Crawford was transferred to US Army Support Command as Deputy to the Commanding General. Early in June, a proposed TD was prepared and submitted for the Sub Area Command Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.

On 17 July 1966, Sub Area Command personnel moved their headquarters and office equipment into new quonsets in the cantonment area. Up until this time, the staff sections, although located in the same offices, had been performing dually for the Depot or Sub Area Command, as appropriate.

In May, much difficulty was experienced in the receipt of assignment instructions for enlisted personnel rotating to CONUS. It became necessary to hold groups from the 510th Engineer Company and the 53rd Engineer Company several days beyond their normal rotation dates until assignment instructions were received.

Major Delbert C. Gaige arrived on 9 May 1966 to take up the duties of Director of Administration. He was subsequently medically evacuated to CONUS on 12 July 1966. The adjutant, Captain Jack D. Gilbert, departed on 9 July 1966 for his new assignment in Japan. Major William C. Cosgrove, arrived on 15 July as Captain Gilbert's replacement but was subsequently given up to Headquarters of US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, as the adjutant general of that headquarters. At the close of this reporting period Major E. L. Kidd was performing duties of both Director of Administration and Adjutant.

SECTION II COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons Learned:

Item: Timely receipt of assignment instructions.

Discussion: Late receipt of assignment instructions for personnel rotating to CONUS was experienced particularly during the month of May 1966. Thirty seven enlisted men from one unit went en masse to the Inspector General with this complaint.

Observation: When assignment instructions were finally received, it was discovered that the Department of the Army assignment authority had invariably been received in-country, in most instances, early enough to permit departure of individuals involved on or prior to their rotation dates. A more efficient method of disseminating assignment instructions upon arrival in Vietnam would be beneficial to all concerned.

CHAPTER II

SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE, PLANS AND TRAINING

SECTION I:

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

At close of period covered by the previous Quarterly Operational Report on Lessons Learned (See report for US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay for period 1 Jan to 30 Apr 66) all 1st logistical Command units stationed at Cam Ranh Bay were under the command and operational control of Headquarters, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay (hereafter referred to as USAD). The headquarters of USAD was staffed from the combined authorized strength of the 504th QM Depot, TUE 10-521E (UIC WZQAAA) and HMD, USAD, TD P5-2500-OC (UIC WZQAAA). Organization of USAD on 1 May 1966 is shown as Tab A. Units assigned to USAD at that time are shown on troop list as Tab B.

The previous report (Chapter II, Section II) discussed the span of control problem evolving from the assignment of fifteen separate companies to USAD without the assignment of any intermediate headquarters units. Ammunition Battalion (Prov) was organized in the previous period for command and control of ammunition companies assigned to USAD. (See Chapter VI, previous report). To further resolve this problem, additional provisional battalions were organized during the period of this report. These commands are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

HMD, Maintenance Battalion (Prov) was established on 1 May 1966 per General Order Number 27, Hcs, USAD, dated 3 May 1966. Maintenance units listed in Tab B were assigned to this battalion. It was commanded by LTC Carl Messinger (QD Corps) who, with his battalion staff, also constituted the Directorate of Maintenance, USAD. This provisional battalion was discontinued on 31 July 1966 with arrival of the 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) at Cam Ranh Bay.

HMD, Supply and Service Battalion (Prov) was established on 8 May 1966, per General Order Number 36, Hcs, USAD, dated 19 May 1966. Supply and service type units indicated in Tab B were assigned to this battalion. It was commanded by Major Frank Luchta (QM Corps). This provisional battalion was discontinued on 1 July 1966 when the newly arrived 96th QM Battalion became operational.

Headquarters, Special Troops (Prov) was established on 25 May 1966 per General Order Number 39, Hcs, USAD, dated 27 May 1966. HMC, 504th QM Depot and HMD, USAD, in addition to other units having a post, camp and station function, were assigned to this headquarters. Major William T. Burnett (QM Corps) was designated Commander of Headquarters, Special Troops, in addition to his other duties as Headquarters Commandant, USAD. HMC, 504th QM Depot was later released from assignment to Special Troops on reorga-

ization of the USAD into three separate, co-equal commands, which is further discussed below.

On 1 June 1966, per General Order Number 11, Hcs, USASC, CRB, US Army Depot was separated into three separate co-equal commands. Additional General Orders applicable to this reorganization are General Orders 12, 14 and 15, Hcs, USASC, dated in June 1966. The purpose of this reorganization was to improve the span of control under Hcs, USASC, and to functionalize like activities under appropriate commands.

Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov) (hereafter referred to as CRBD) was established for the command and control of logistical units performing a depot function. The mission of CRBD is: "To receive, store, issue and maintain items of equipment and supplies as directed by higher authority; to command and provide for operational planning, control, and supervision of assigned and attached units performing depot missions; and to provide support and administrative services necessary to the health, welfare and morale of assigned and attached units." The headquarters of CRBD is staffed with elements of HMC, 504th Field Depot, TUE 29-521T (formerly HMC, 504th QM Depot, TUE 10-521E), and those elements authorized by TD F5-2500-08 which have a depot function. Colonel N.A. Gage, Jr., (Trans Corps) assumed command of CRBD on 1 June 1966. Units assigned to CRBD as of the close of this report on 31 July 1966 are shown as Tab C. Organization is depicted as Tab D.

Cam Ranh Bay Sub Area Command (Prov) (hereafter referred to as CRBSA) was established for the command and control of those elements authorized in TD F5-2500-08 which have a post, camp and station function, in addition to other units having similar functions. Further discussion of this organization will be found in separate Quarterly Operational Report on Lessons Learned to be submitted by Hcs, CRBSA for this period.

Cam Ranh Bay Port (Prov) was established for command and control of all transportation units assigned Cam Ranh Bay, less maintenance units. Its mission is the port clearance of cargo received from all ships arriving at Cam Ranh Bay. Further discussion of this organization will be found in separate Quarterly Operational Report on Lessons Learned to be submitted by Cam Ranh Bay Port for this period.

One of the most significant observations noted after reorganizations discussed above was the new impetus given to the construction program for the Cam Ranh Bay Depot facilities. When previously organized as US Army Depot, a single commander had responsibility not only for depot operations and construction of required facilities, but also for post, camp and station functions which included construction of troop billets and garrison facilities, plus operation of piers and transportation activities associated with discharge of cargo and port clearance, as well as construction of new pier facilities. Colonel Gage's thorough knowledge of depot operations and facilities requirements, coupled with establishment of higher priorities for construction of these facilities by higher authority, has resulted

in numerous improvements in warehousing techniques, and completion of much needed warehouses and hardstand open storage areas.

The lack of adequate storage facilities in the past has caused a dissipation of approximately fifty-percent of the troop effort, during the reporting period, in requirements for rewarehousing and movement of supplies from one location to another. This problem was further aggravated by an imbalance in the ratio of troops available for storage operations as compared to troops available for port discharge. A shortage of personnel in storage operations resulted in improper storage of supplies because cargo was coming in to the depot faster than personnel could receive and properly process it for storage. This problem has been somewhat resolved due to the reorganization of supply and service type units under the CUSTAR configuration, which is discussed below, and the requirement that depot operations be conducted on a continuous schedule, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.

Supply, service and maintenance units assigned to Cam Ranh Bay Depot were redesignated and reorganized effective 1 July 1966 per General Order Number 157, HQs, USARPAC, dated 14 July 1966. The effect of CUSTAR reorganization (Combat Service Support to the Army) is the elimination of combat service support along previously established technical services channels and the consolidation of this support into functionalized supply units and functionalized maintenance units, thereby providing one-stop service support to the user. Elimination of the duplication of effort by the CUSTAR reorganization has provided the Cam Ranh Bay Depot with additional personnel in operations where a critical shortage previously existed.

A shortage of supply and service type units continues to exist in depot operations, particularly as a result of the completion of additional piers in the Cam Ranh Bay Port. This shortage is currently being resolved by operations being conducted in accordance with the schedule previously mentioned. Higher authority has been requested to look into the feasibility of expediting the training being given to these type units in CONUS which are scheduled for deployment to this command. It is believed possible to curtail the training of these units to provide for their earlier deployment and subsequent assignment to depot operations where they can receive "on the job training" which will contribute directly to accomplishment of the depot mission.

SECTION II

RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons Learned:

ITEM: There has been an imbalance between the capability of the Port and that of the Depot.

DISCUSSION: Emphasis in the past has been on up-grading the capabili-

the Cam Ranh Bay Port to operate the additional piers nearing completion. The arrival of these units prior to completion of new pier facilities has provided the Port with increased capability to discharge from existing piers at a faster rate than the Depot can receive these increased tonnages. Subsequent completion of new piers, thereby permitting additional ships to berth, will further increase Port discharge capability. In comparison, the Cam Ranh Bay Depot has not received additional troop units at the same rate as the Port. This imbalance has caused a backlog of supplies in depot receiving areas requiring processing for storage.

OBSERVATION: Future scheduling of troop unit deployments should consider all interrelated factors when developing the phase-in dates for these troop units.

ITEM: Construction of depot storage facilities has not been in phase with shipment of increased tonnages of supplies and equipment to this depot.

DISCUSSION: The lack of adequate storage facilities (warehouses and hardstand open storage areas) to accommodate increased shipments of supplies and equipment to this depot has resulted in a considerable dissipation of troop effort in rewarehousing and relocation of supplies and equipment. A factor also contributing to this problem has been discussed in the above item. Incoming cargo in many instances has been located initially in whatever open area was available, either in existing warehouses or in unimproved open storage areas. Much of this cargo has had to be relocated several times in order to make way for additional construction when construction effort became available. This has contributed to slow reaction time in locating supplies and equipment for shipments.


OBSERVATION: The job of constructing facilities for depot storage operations should be completed prior to shipping supplies and equipment to that depot. Shipping of supplies and equipment to a depot should be in phase with the ability of the depot to properly receive and store these items.

ITEM: Training programs of units scheduled for deployment to a combat area during a hasty build-up should be accelerated to meet operational requirements.

DISCUSSION: Rapid build-up of supplies and equipment required for support of combat operations is dependent upon having adequate troop units available for the handling of these items. With exception of that training which must be given to technical supervisors, training of individuals for supply handling functions can be accelerated in COMUS with additional training provided in area of deployment by "on the job training". This will permit earlier deployment of these units commensurate with operational requirements.

OBSERVATION: Future activation and organization of units for deployment to a theater of combat operations should provide for a program of accelerated training in COMUS when "on the job training" can be provided in the area to which the unit is to be deployed.

ORGANIZATION
OF U.S. ARMY DEPOT
1 MAY 1966



TROOP LIST
U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay
1 May 1966

HEADQUARTERS UNITS

HHC, 504th Quartermaster Depot
HHD, US Army Depot
9th Finance Detachment
20th Finance Detachment
136th Medical Detachment (Disp)
161st Medical Detachment (Disp)
3d Platoon 53d Medical Co (Ambulance)
530th Engineer Detachment (Fire Trk)
575th AG Detachment (Postal Unit)
600th Engineer Detachment (Water Purific)

SUPPLY & SERVICE UNITS

53d Engineer Company (Supply Point)
67th Engineer Detachment (Gas Generating)
59th Quartermaster Company (Fld Maint & Services)
185th Quartermaster Detachment (Bakery)
600th Engineer Detachment (Water Purification)
74th Ordnance Company (Supply Depot)
136th Ordnance Company (Park)
524th Quartermaster Company (POTRL Depot)
350th Quartermaster Company (Surveillance)
647th Quartermaster Company (Field Depot)
6th Quartermaster Detachment (Platoon Hqs)
49th Quartermaster Detachment (Supply)
154th Quartermaster Detachment (Supply)
292d Quartermaster Detachment (MHE)

AMMUNITION UNITS

Ammunition Battalion (Prov)
HMD, Ammunition Battalion (Prov)
133 Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
174th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Renov)
606th Ordnance Company (Ammo)
611th Ordnance Company (Ammo)
630th Ordnance Company (Ammo)

MAINTENANCE UNITS

31st Ordnance Company (DAS)
82d Transportation Company (Amphib Maint)
169th Transportation Detachment (Fltg Craft Maint)
128th Signal Company (Depot)
510th Engineer Company (Maint)(DS)
554th Ordnance Company (DAS)
184th Quartermaster Detachment (MHE Repair)
342d Quartermaster Detachment (MHE Repair)

TRANSPORTATION UNITS

10th Transportation Battalion (Tml)
HHD, 10th Transportation Battalion (Tml)
" 469th Transportation Detachmont (US Army Vessel Page)
10th Transportation Company (Mdm Trk)
63d Transportation Company (Lt Truck)
97th Transportation Company (Hvy Boat)
271st Transportation Detachment (Tug Crew)
276th Transportation Detachment (Float Crano)
355th Transportation Detachment (POL Tanker)
358th Transportation Detachment (Tug Crew)
123d Transportation Company (Tml Svc)
261st Transportation Detachmont (MHE Maint)
263d Transportation Detachment (Crano Crew)
578th Transportation Detachment (THE Oper)
155th Transportation Company (Tml Svc)
347th Transportation Company (LARC-V)
159th Transportation Detachment (LIRC-V Maint)
515th Transportation Company (Lt Trk)
1st Platoon, 564th Transportation Company (Lt Trk)
565th Transportation Company (Tml Svc)
870th Transportation Company (Tml Svc)
1097th Transportation Company (Mdm Boat)
266th Transportation Detachment (Petrl Boat)
267th Transportation Detachment (IQd Barge)
486th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
492d Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)
498th Transportation Detachment (Tug Crew)
504th Transportation Detachment (Reefer Barge)

TROOP LIST
CAB. RANK DAY LILLOT (PROV)
31 July 1966

HHC, 504th Field Depot

Ammunition Battalion (Prov)

HHD, Ammunition Battalion (Prov)

133d Ordnance Detachment (EOD)

174th Ordnance Detachment (Ammo Renov)

606th Ordnance Company (Ammo)

611th Ordnance Company (Ammo)

630th Ordnance Company (Ammo)

69th Maintenance Battalion (GS)

HHD, 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS)

128th Signal Company (Depot)

129th Main Support Company (DS)

136th Maintenance Company (Light)

510th Engineer Company (Maint) (DS)

96th Supply & Service Battalion (DS)

HHC, 96th Supply & Service Battalion (DS)

31st Supply Company (Hvy Maint) (GS)

67th Engineer Detachment (Gas Generating)

273d Engineer Detachment (Supply)

53d Supply Company (GS)

59th Field Service Company (GS)

567th Engineer Detachment (Water Transport)

74th Supply Company (Repair Parts) (GS) (CZ)

221st Supply & Service Company (DS)


226th Supply & Service Company (DS)

524th Quartermaster Company (Petrl Op)

647th Quartermaster Company (Petrl Op)

TAB C

ORGANIZATION
CAM RANH BAY DEPOT (PROV)
31 July 1966



	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
AUTHORIZED:	170	36	4250	4456
ASSIGNED:	176	40	4091	4307
PRESENT FOR DUTY:	140	26	3768	3937

Tab D

CHAPTER III

DIRECTORATE OF SUPPLY

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Many new developments and changes occurred with in the Directorate of Supply during the past three months. Among the most significant were the mechanization of the stock records system, the receipt and integration of the Army Material Command push package of approximately 53,000 line items with existing depot stocks, the withdrawal of the 14th ICC to Saigon, and the reorganization of the Stock Control Division into the present Directorate of Supply. Most of the developments that occurred contributed to the vast improvement of the Cam Ranh Bay Depot operations.

A. Major Operational Activities and Changes: The major operational activities will be discussed in two categories: Class I activities and Class II & IV activities.

Class I: Effective 1 May 1966 Class I requisitions were no longer sent through Saigon. Instead, they were all routed through Okinawa. During the period 14 May through 2 July an Inventory of Class I supplies was conducted by Federal Supply Class.

On 26 May a Team of Officers from the USARV G-4 office visited the Class I facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and were quite interested in a proposed commercial recombined milk and milk products plant. A proposed site in the general area of the new convalescent center on North Beach was pointed out to the team.

Throughout the period various ships unloaded perishable subsistence at Cam Ranh Bay. A new refrigeration barge was placed into operation on 12 May 1966 which provided an additional 46,676 cubic feet of cold storage space. This brought the total gross refrigeration space to 101,010 cubic feet. During June the gross reefer space increased to 118,730 cubic feet, although only 76,370 cubic feet was usable space. Repair parts for inoperable reefer space were RED BALL requisitioned through the 10th Transportation Bn. In July the gross reefer space increased to 133,530 cubic feet, net usable space being 85,740 cubic feet.

In early June three new 1600 cubic feet reefer boxes were installed in the Class I ration breakdown. Also, eleven new 1600 cubic feet reefer boxes were installed for Depot storage. Additionally, during July 86 tons of nonperishable rations were released to Ban Me Thout for anticipated requirements.

Class II & IV: During May a major operational change occurred when the stock records system was converted from a manual to a mechanized system. The balance file for the Firepower and Mobility branch was the first to be mechanized, and the first activity was processed mechanically on 13 May 1966. Mechanization of the balance files for the Industrial, Electronics, and General Material branches was completed during the last half of May and activity began mechanically on 24 May 1966. In the new

system, all Availability Balance Cards and all supply transactions are prepared and processed on punched cards by the Data Processing Division, now under the Supply Directorate for operational control. Although the mechanized procedures have vastly improved the stock record system, a few problems have developed which will be discussed later in this report.

Another major activity during May was the arrival of the Army Materiel Command push package, Project YZJ, which arrived at Cam Ranh Bay on the USN's PVT DROSTRON on 21 May 1966. Initial plans for integrating this package into the Depot stockage were made by an AMC team headed by Colonel McConnell, the Director for Supply and Transportation, Pueblo Army Depot, which arrived on 14 May. This team developed the storage plan and coordinated it with stock control personnel. The package consisted of approximately 53,000 line items in 70 vans and 437 conex containers. Complete documentation was received with the package including prepunched receipt and locator cards. The vans and conexes were placed in permanent storage areas, and receipt was effected mechanically after the storage pattern was completed. Approximately 92% of the package was excellently binned and ready for immediate issue. A preliminary match of the items received with zero balance items having dues-out on the balance cards indicated that over 6000 FSN's were matched. In summary, this push package constituted a superior achievement and greatly increased the supply effectiveness of this depot.

On 17 May, the 67th Gas Generating Plant became operational. As a result, this depot ceased requisitioning nitrogen, oxygen, and acetylene from Okinawa. A system was implemented whereby units, to include the Nha Trang Support Class II & IV activity, could obtain these items on a one for one exchange basis.

The Firepower and Mobility branch received in May support card decks for most major weapons in Vietnam from the US Army Weapons Command. These decks were compared against the ASL for the purpose of adding those items not already on the ASL and to validate requisition objectives. In addition, during June 681 line items were added to the ASL in support of the M-107 and M-110 Self-Propelled Howitzers. Also, repair parts support for the 105mm M-108 Self-Propelled Howitzer was being developed.

In accordance with the standardization plan for Material Handling Equipment (MHE) as directed by CG, US Army Materiel Command, an additional 200 line items of repair parts were added to the ASL. Future shipments of standardized MHE will include 30 days' supply of repair parts. The US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay received ten 10,000 lb RT forklifts and two electrical forklifts for depot operations in June.

In the General Material branch priority requisitions for "Prime" dog food began arriving in June. Moreover, GI medium tents and emergency requirements for toilet paper and soap products were of major concern. During this reporting period, the General Material branch submitted a weekly special status report to 1st Logistical Command on Critical Items detailing the dues-in, dues-out and on-hand balance for each item on the report.

During June each of the Commodity branches started a program of re-computing requisition objectives and also deleting those items from the ASL that did not show any demands and on-hand balances. This program was still in process during July.

B. Major Organizational Changes and Administrative Activities: On 22 June a team of sixteen Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) arrived at Cam Ranh Bay Depot to assist depot personnel in an advisory capacity. These people came from various depot backgrounds in CONUS. A systems analyst among this group undertook the project of reorganizing the Stock Control Division into the present Directorate of Supply. In essence, this reorganization combined the Stock Control Division with the Data Processing Division, formerly under operational control of the 14th ICC, into one Directorate. A new division consisting of the five commodity branches was also established within the Directorate. The total organization of the new Directorate of Supply is as follows:

Office of the Director

Administrative Office
Systems Coordinator and Material Readiness Expeditor (MRE)

Stock Control Division

Document Control Branch
Status & Files Branch
Inventory & Adjustments Branch
Editing & Cataloging Branch

Supply Management Division

Firepower & Mobility Branch
General Material Branch
Industrial Supply Branch
Electronics Branch
Subsistence Branch

Data Processing Division

Machine Operations Branch
Systems & Programming Branch
Statistics & Analysis Branch

The above organizational structure and a series of functional statements for each division and branch were approved on 7 July for implementation. In addition, the DAC systems analyst also prepared a set of job descriptions for the Director and each of the division chiefs. The reorganization provides one director full operational control over the stock records, supply management, and data processing functions.

C. Statistical Supply Profile of Cam Ranh Bay Depot: Three Statistical measures are used to indicate the supply profile of all supply activity.

These are (1) Demand Accommodation, (2) Supply Effectiveness and (3) Demand Satisfaction. Demand Accommodation is that percentage of total requests received that are on the depot Authorized Stockage List (ASL).

Supply effectiveness represents the percentage of requests received for ASL items that the depot was able to fill to include backorder releases. Demand satisfaction is the percentage of requests for ASL items that were initially filled by the depot.

SUPPLY PROFILE

CAM RANH BAY DEPOT

For The Period 1 May Through 31 July 1966

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>DEMAND ACCOMMODATION</u>	<u>SUPPLY EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>DEMAND SATISFACTION</u>
1 May	74.1%	53.2%	39.0%
15 May	74.9	25.1	16.1
31 May	85.9	43.5	13.9
15 June	96.3	62.1	20.7
30 June	93.9	38.4	32.9
15 July	92.9	33.9	27.6
31 July	78.9	33.7	30.6

During the first half of May demand accommodation rose to 74.9%. Supply effectiveness and demand satisfaction dropped sharply due to receipts from storage being very low during most of the period. A major rewarehouse project was the main reason for the delay of receipts. During the second half of May demand accommodation for the first time exceeded the 85% standard. This was attributed to the firm identification of ASL items made possible through mechanization. Supply effectiveness rose sharply as the resumption of receipts from storage allowed the release of thousands of backorders. Initial fill dropped 2.2% due to the high percentage of ASL receipts processed in the last half of May.

During the first half of June demand accommodation rose to 96.3% as a result of the addition and integration of the AMC push package. Supply effectiveness rose to 62.1% because of the large number of dues-out released. Another encouraging trend was the increase in initial fills to 20.7%, reflecting an improving on hand balance position. In the last half of June demand accommodation remained high at 93.9%. Supply effectiveness dropped from 62.1% to 38.4%. However, this was anticipated. During the previous two weeks numerous backorders had been filled by the receipt of the AMC 60-day push package. On the other hand, initial fill of ASL requisitions rose to 32.9% during the same two-week period.

In early July demand accommodation remained high at 92.9%. Moreover, supply effectiveness and demand satisfaction did not change significantly from the second half of June. During the last two weeks of July, demand accommodation dropped to 78.9%. This was attributed to the reduction of ASL items by 23,000 during the past 30 days. On the other hand, supply effectiveness remained approximately the same while the initial fill increased by 3.0%.

D. Significant Problems Arising During Period: The conversion from a manual to a mechanized stock record system produced a series of problems during the first weeks of operations. Minor errors were becoming the source of major problems. There were gaps in detailed procedures written for use within the entire system. Furthermore, there was inadequate training within the commodity groups concerning the operation of a mechanized system. Additional personnel within the Data Processing Division during the period of development were needed to assist in correction of procedures and detected errors. Many of the errors in the system were not machine or procedural errors, but simple errors due to a lack of understanding on the part of individuals. The main problem was that minor errors were not being detected and corrected in order to prevent future problems. The solutions to this problem will be discussed in section II of this report.

Another problem area that evolved concerned warehouse denials. Hundreds of material releases going to the storage areas were being returned as denials even though many of the items were actually somewhere in the depot storage area. The basic problem was that the stock simply could not be located. The two principal causes of the denials were (1) the receipt documents were arriving in stock control and material release documents were being processed and sent to storage before the stocks received could be located; and (2) because of the lack of warehouse storage space and the procedure of storing the same line items in various locations spread throughout the depot, many items were in the depot but could not be located by the warehouse and storage personnel. As a consequence, hundreds of release orders had to be returned to stock control to be either backordered or passed, depending on their priority. The solutions to this problem are discussed in section II under Logistics.

A third major problem area involved both the changeover and lack of personnel. During the latter part of May the loss of personnel was quickly becoming a significant problem in the Directorate of Supply. The requirement was for 249 people to include 11 officers, 17 Department of the Army Civilians, and 221 Enlisted Personnel and/or Vietnamese local nationals. Of the 130 people assigned in May, 73 were members of the 14th ICC, due to be transferred to Saigon in early July. Furthermore, by July many of the trained personnel were beginning to rotate back to CONUS. Therefore, the changeover and lack of personnel, coupled with the new mechanized system, presented quite a problem. Efforts were made to draw replacements from local resources until other replacements could be brought in. It was also recommended that personnel from the 14th ICC remaining at CRB be transferred to the US Army Depot, CRB.

A fourth major problem concerned a critical shortage of Materials Handling Equipment and cranes at this depot. The Industrial Supply branch requisitioned sufficient quantities of these items on high priority TWX requisitions to alleviate the problem. In addition, follow-up action was taken to insure that these items would be secured as they became available.

A fifth problem area involved MRE (Material Readiness Expeditors) visits to the depot. On several occasions MRE's coming to the CRB Depot observed what appeared, or were alleged, to be stocks on hand that their units required. Rather than come back through the Director of Supply with the information so that prompt action, if necessary, could be taken, they would instead return to home stations and initiate inquiries through command channels. Investigation usually revealed that the stock in question had already been released in accordance with the priority of issue established under MILSTRIP and was merely awaiting shipment to the customer. This practice served only to delay the actual release of supplies and consumed much additional time at command and management levels.

The Director of Supply recommended that if the MRE program is to be effective, the officers selected as MRE's be impressed with the necessity of dealing directly with operational personnel on such matters and as an after-action, if deemed warranted, initiate appropriate command action. In any case, necessary supply action should be taken first to give the system a chance to produce.

SECTION II COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Section II will discuss solutions to the problems which were presented in the first section. It will also stress problem areas still existing and what the Directorate plans to do about them. Three functional areas will be discussed: personnel, operations and training, and logistica. A series of lessons learned during the past three months will follow.

A. Personnel: As discussed earlier, the turnover and the lack of adequately trained personnel developed into a critical issue during the past three months. As the 14th ICC pulled their personnel out to be transferred to Saigon, the problem became even more critical. The Director recommended that key personnel from the 14th ICC be allowed to remain at the depot until new replacements could be adequately trained in the mechanized procedures. Concurrently, he recommended that a portion of the 14th ICC people needed at Cam Ranh Bay be transferred to the 504th QM Depot for duty.

Another measure taken to alleviate the personnel problem was the increased use of Vietnamese local nationals. Approximately 30 additional nationals were hired between May and July to work as stock control clerks, key punch operators, and document control clerks within the various branches and divisions. Most of the jobs they were assigned involved routine handling of stock record and transaction cards, a vital part of the new mechanized stock records system.

The Directorate also requested additional personnel from the 96th QM Battalion to help alleviate the shortage of qualified supply personnel. At the end of July approximately 75 new stock control personnel were scheduled to be assigned to the Directorate out of the new COSTAR organization.

B. Operations and Training: Several activities occurred in the training area during May, June, and July. First of all, to assist in alleviating the problems brought on by mechanization, a team was established to develop a meaningful OJT (On the Job Training) program at the working level with the more experienced personnel training and supervising the more inexperienced people. Secondly, two formal classroom training sessions designed to familiarize and to explain correct procedures were held in May and early July. These sessions were taught by various branch chiefs. Close supervision of personnel in all branches was followed. In addition, senior data processing supervisors from the Saigon detachment of the 14th ICC were utilized at Cam Ranh Bay to insure adequate operations in the data processing division. The OJT program was significantly extended as more Vietnamese local nationals became assigned; however, they did not receive formal classroom training. Recommendations for solving these problems were threefold: (1) give enlisted personnel a general overall orientation initially; (2) introduce them to their specific function, and once they learn that job (3) conduct a reorientation program. It was stressed that just as supervision "follow up" is a necessity, so too the personnel re-orientation to the entire stock control depot picture is necessary to increase their ability to understand their own job and its function in the entire organization.

Other training received consisted of sending key data processing personnel to Saigon to attend classroom training on programming the UNIVAC 1005 computer. This computer will be used in the new mechanized system once the new Directorate for Supply building is completed. So far, only personnel from the Data Processing Division have attended the course.

C. Logistics: Many actions were taken to improve the logistical operations within the Directorate during the last three months. First of all, to minimize the problems caused by mechanization of the stock records system, a team was established to write a functional procedures manual which would integrate all of the procedures within the Directorate of Supply. This task was accomplished in early June and proved to be a tremendous help in smoothing operations and clarifying the flow of documents. A plan to develop desk manuals and procedures manuals within each branch has been recommended for further development and implementation.

To alleviate the problem of warehouse denials, it is recommended that receipt documents be held at the receiving area until such time that the supplies can be put on location within a warehouse and the locator files updated. In addition, the Directorate recommends that a reorganization of the warehouse area by commodities would eliminate the problem of having to search various locations for one line item. A major rewarehousing project is now in process which, when completed, should eliminate or minimize the problem of multiple stock locations.

It is further recommended that, when the rewarehousing project is completed, a complete commodity, or line item, inventory be accomplished. This is the only way the stock record balance cards can be reconciled with the actual physical quantities on hand in the depot.

During July the Directorate of Supply and the Directorate of Storage worked out a mutual agreement to establish a special warehouse refusal investigation team (WRIT) with the sole purpose of researching warehouse denials. The WRIT team searched the warehouse area trying to locate supplies that could be used to fill requisitions that had already been denied. During July the team's effectiveness varied from 15 to 35 percent. The Directorate recommends that the WRIT team be continued as a research team until such time that the rewarehousing project is completed and all stocks of each line item are placed in one location.

Lessons Learned:

Liaison Between Supply and Storage Directorates

Item: Close liaison must continually be maintained between the Director of Storage and the Director of Supply and their supporting staff officers to insure immediate and accurate inventory adjustment upon physical receipt of supplies.

Discussion: Close liaison is particularly important in the local operational environment due to the many "push" and multiple pack shipments received from CONUS and Okinawa without a normal requisition and due-in being established for the item. Special emphasis must be placed upon critical items due-out to the field units. This should include research of ships' manifest for selected items in short or non-stock position to insure immediate stockage adjustment and release of dues-out to customers. Expedited shipments and the related document processing through stock control and storage division disrupts normal operations and seriously weakens internal control.

Observation: The aforementioned actions should be strictly controlled and executed only when proper review of the urgency warrants the results disruption of operations. Such expedited actions should be personally coordinated through all subordinate divisions by a staff representative or liaison officer of the commander authorizing such action since the scope of the operation crosses the authority of two or more operating divisions, for example, stock control, storage and transportation.

Utilization of Vietnamese Local Nationals

Item: At the present time, Vietnamese local nationals can only be used to do routine-type work as stock control clerks.

Discussion: Primarily, as a result of the language barrier, local nationals employed by this directorate are of limited value in technical positions until extended on-the-job training can be accomplished.

Observation: One English speaking national will be assigned to each

employing six or more local nationals. Also, another has been assigned at Supply Directorate level. Moreover, centralized technical training should be conducted in the native language for all special skilled employees in an area of operation through the use of selected local nationals considered competent in that field. Such training should be accomplished on a general, overall basis before placing the local nationals in a job with detailed instructions concerning particular duties of that specific job.

Conversion to Mechanized System

Item: In May the four commodity branches converted from manual stock records to mechanized (offset) system.

Discussion: In April the commodity branches started phasing into the mechanized system. The first step of this conversion was to keypunch the due-in (TC-2) file. After this was accomplished the due-out (TC-7) file was keypunched. The final step in the conversion was the annotating of the on hand quantity on the Availability Balance Card (ABC). Simultaneously, the annotating of the ABC's federal supply classes was accomplished on the mechanized system.

Observation: The success or failure of any major change depends on the advance planning and coordination with all elements.

Storage of Dry Cell Batteries and Photographic Supplies

Item: Dry cell batteries and photographic supplies.

Discussion: Dry cell batteries and photographic supplies deteriorate rapidly in a tropical climate and should not be exposed to heat, humidity, rain and temperature changes.

Observation: Dry cell batteries and photographic supplies should be stored in a cool dry place. Since this is not practical at the present time, adequate inside storage has been provided for these items protecting them from rain and direct heat from the sun.

Items Subject to Pilferage

Item: Many signal items such as survival radios, cameras, film and magnetic recording tape are subject to loss due to pilferage.

Discussion: "Nice to have" items like those indicated above are subject to an exceptionally high rate of loss due to pilferage and should be stored in a secure area.

Observation: These items are now stored in a security warehouse and the rate of loss has decreased sharply. Losses of these items can now be traced to the receiving area, to the men who move the items to the security warehouse and to the local nationals employed by the depot. Closer supervision of the enlisted men and a shake down of all local nationals would prevent most pilferage from occurring at this time.

DIRECTORATE OF STORAGE

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

General: This period saw a significant change in the organization and staffing of the storage directorate. Lt. Col. Austin F. Tussing assumed duty of Director of Storage replacing Major John W. Kimman, who rotated to CONUS. Major William S. Knodel, interim director, assumed duties of Deputy Director. With the availability of additional officers, the Directorate was organized along commodity lines, with Captain Nicholas Craddock assuming duties as subsistence officer, Captain Terence Doherty replacing Captain Terence B. Inman in General Material; and Captain Dean R. Frost assuming Petroleum duties. Major William C. Cook became Chief of Engineer Construction while Captain Carl M. Wilhite assumed duties as Operations Officer. Sgt Maj Vincent J. Dougherty replaced Sgt Maj Amos O. Sensenig as Directorate Sgt Maj.

The reorganization on 24 July 1966 in the COSTAR configuration created some problems in positioning personnel. In order to maintain unit integrity, it was necessary to shift experienced personnel from one warehouse or storage area to another, reducing effectiveness until personnel could be trained in their new areas.

Subsistence: Storage space became the major problem of Class I during the period. Heavy receipts at a rate of almost 500 tons per day from 24 May through 15 July, occupied all assigned space and forced storage of subsistence in unprepared locations. All subsistence in covered storage was removed during this period and placed in outside areas. Late in July, 144,000 sq ft of hard surface was made available for Class I and immediate action was taken to relocate subsistence in temporary areas to this location. An additional 144,000 was released on 30 July, increasing the capability. A final 144,000 sq ft is under construction and should be completed by 15 August. This hard-stand area is planned to accommodate all "B" rations in the depot.

Perishable storage improved in May with activation of reefer barge 6668. In addition, a construction project began in June on a proposed eighty-eight 1600 cu foot reefer boxes on the pier for perishable storage. At the end of the period, 34 were operational. Reefer barge 6668, was deactivated about 28 July because of maintenance problems but was replaced by the Commercial Refrigerated Ship, "Yaque" which was assigned as floating storage for this area.

General Supplies: Covered storage space has improved during the reporting period. At present, Class II has eight 120' X 200' warehouses and fifteen 40' X 220' warehouses. A project of construction of wooden bins for storage of supplies in warehouses 61 and 62 is close to completion. Box and bulk storage locations in warehouses 64 and 65 will provide back up storage for these two warehouses. Open Storage Area 2 will soon be cleared. Items previously stored in that area have been issued or sent to the newly opened warehouses for storage. The area adjacent to warehouses 90 and 93 has been hard surfaced and new open storage areas known as EI and DJ have been established.

The Storage area has been renumbered using a grid system. This new system allows for expansion and provides for a systematic method for numbering present and future warehouses.

(General Supplies Cont'd)

The entire Class II operation is undergoing a significant restaffing due to rotations and the reorganization under COSTAR.

Petroleum: Tank Farm #1 was completed during the first part of this period. It consists of 16 each, 10,000 barrel and 4 each, 3,000 barrel steel bolted tanks. It is a two product tank farm with 149,000 barrels of its capacity used for JP-4 and 23,000 barrels for Avgas.

Construction of Tank Farm #2 was started the first part of July. Estimate construction time is 3 months. This will be a 204,000 barrel 4 product farm with a truck fill capability.

On 20 July 1966, the 524th QM Co (Petrl Op) was reorganized under COSTAR and the 647th QM Co (Petrl Co) was formed. Under the new organization, the 524th will be responsible for Tank Farm #1, the pipeline, the POL Pier, Marine Operations, and the Package Yard at the North End of the Depot. The newly formed 647th will have the Package Yard on the MSR, the DS Supply of bulk fuels adjacent to the POL Pier, and Tank Farm #2, upon completion of this facility.

The South Beach DS supply of bulk fuels was moved in July to the area adjacent to the POL Pier. The mission of providing fuel to individual vehicles was turned over to the TMP at the end of July.

On 30 July, a warehouse was designated for the Chemical items stored in the POL Package Yards. Preliminary plans are now being made for the movement of these supplies.

During June and July, a large percentage of the key petroleum personnel rotated. Replacements are continuing to come in.

The repair facility for the 500 gallon collapsible drums was moved from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon during this period. It is now operational at that location.

A total of 9,388 drums of JP-4, 4,186 drums of Avgas, 7,654 drums of Mogas, and 8,682 drums of diesel were shipped during this period. A total of 15,748 drums were shipped during July alone. This was 112% increase over the month of May.

Bulk issues of all products to all users continued to rise during this period as more equipment continues to drive in the area.

The Air Force Tank Farm should be operational the first part of August. This will eliminate the need of transporting Avgas and JP-4 to the air base.

Construction is under way at Cam Ranh Air Base to accomodate multi-engine jet planes. Upon completion, jet fuel consumption will rise sharply.

Engineer Construction: The 512th Engineer Detachment, commanded by 2nd Lt. Larry Hall was assigned to Engineer Class IV. The mission of this detachment was to install a stock records section for Engineer Class IV.

(Engineer Construction C. nt'd)

detachment of 21 men set up a complete stock record system to include accumulation of demand data and requisitioning against due-outs. They also rewarehoused items subject to weather damage into one warehouse and one shed.

The storage area of the Engineer Class IV was increased by approximately 1,000,000 square feet. This allowed establishment of lot storage for special project material and gave additional storage space for stockage material. Approximately 700,000 square feet of this new area is due to be hardstand area. This will greatly facilitate utilization of Commercial Material Handling Equipment.

The personnel of the 53rd Engineer Company, the support troops for the yard, rotated during the month of May. Almost all personnel presently in the company arrived in-country during the month of May. This required extensive training in depot storage. The Company Commander, Captain Pastor, was also OIC of the Engineer Class IV yard.

On 12 July, a Staff Representative, Major Walter C. Cock, QMC, of the Storage Directorate was assigned responsibility for Engineer Class IV and the 53rd Engineer Company Commander was released from this responsibility. This allowed a clearer chain of responsibility through the Director of Storage to the operators of the Engineer Class IV yard. A program of relocation and consolidation of scattered material was instituted. Additional equipment operators were trained to increase the flexibility of operating platoons.

SECTION II COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons Learned:

Discharge of Reefer Ship

Item: Difficulty is frequently encountered in unloading reefer ships.

Discussion: Reefer ships with perishable subsistence are generally discharged in stream by various types of lighterage. Travel time from ship to shore and finally to refrigerated storage location varies from 30 minutes to one hour. In the heat of the day, this type of exposure is harmful to these products.

Observation: All reefer ships should be discharged at pier ashore to reduce handling time.

Shortage of Storage Area and Equipment

Item: There is a serious unbalance in the area available for storage and the equipment available to move material.

Discussion:

- a. The Depot has moved full scale in building warehouse and opening up

(Section II Cont'd)

open storage areas. This allows for increased receipts of cargo. With the increase in port operations personnel and transportation truck units, the flow of cargo has greatly increased.

b. The availability of material handling equipment, especially rough terrain type equipment, has not increased in proportion to the increase of storage area and ability of transportation to move cargo.

Observation: Top priority must be given to insuring that adequate quantities of MHE are available to the Depot as storage area and cargo moved increases.

Shipment of Class I to Local Ration Breakdown

Item: Shortage of transportation for shipment to local breakdown

Discussion: Responsibility for transportation of Class I from the depot to local ration breakdown is assigned to the receiving activity. The single S & P assigned is insufficient to accomodate the quantity of supplies needed by the activity. Trucks have been continuously furnished by the depot to reduce backlog which at times exceeded 500 tons.

Observation: Adequate vehicles should be provided ration breakdown to pick up supplies. This would eliminate the need for the depot to provide transportation.

CHAPTER V

DIRECTORATE OF MAINTENANCE

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The Directorate of Maintenance remained essentially unchanged from the previous quarter with a staff of 6 officers, 1 warrant officer and 7 enlisted men.

On 20 May 1966 the 500 gallon collapsible POL Drum Repair Facility was discontinued at Cam Ranh Bay and moved to Qui Nhon. This directorate furnished 3 enlisted men on TDY to help establish this facility and start production. On 29 June the 3 enlisted men were extended on TDY until 12 August, their DEROs, to help solve some of the problems which they had encountered in repair.

General Order Number 27, HQ, USAD CRB dated 3 May 1966 established a Provisional Maintenance Battalion. The staff of this battalion was for the most part the staff of the Directorate of Maintenance with the additional personnel being drawn from the companies of the battalion. The following companies were attached to Maintenance Battalion (DS) (PROV): 31st Ord Co (DAS), 554th Ord Co (DAS), 128th Sig Co (Depot) (-). Supply Platoon, 510th Engr Co (Maint) (DS), 82nd Trans Co (AGS), and the supply section and maintenance platoon of the 59th QM Co (FM). The 76th Engr Co (Maint) (DS) arrived from CONUS on 8 June 1966 and was attached to the battalion.

Vietnamese nationals were hired starting 13 June and were placed in the consolidated supply section and auto-repair shop. At the present time there are 30 indigenous personnel working in various areas of maintenance.

The 82nd Trans Co was deactivated by General Order Number 141, HQ, USARPAC, dated 21 June 1966, and was established as the United States Marine Maintenance Activity, Viet Nam, by General Order Number 471, HQ, USARV, dated 6 July 1966, with effective date 1 July 1966. This unit is assigned to 1st Logistical Command with no intervening Hqs.

COSTAR reorganization was effected on 26 July 1966. The 76th Engr. Co (Maint) (DS) was inactivated and the personnel were moved to fill the vacancies in all units at CRB. The 31st Ord Co (DAS) was the carrier unit for the 129th Main Support Co. The 554th Ord Co (DAS) was the carrier unit for the 136th Maint. Co (Lt) (DS). On 31 July 1966 Hq & Hq Det., 69th Maintenance Battalion (GS) arrived from CONUS. The battalion is presently preparing to receive the attachment of the following units: 129th Main Support Co (DS), 136th Maint Co (Lt) (DS), 128th Signal Co (Depot), and the 510th Engr. Co (Maint) (DS).

SECTION II COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) Long range activities include a one year maintenance contract with the VINNELL Corp. to maintain all General Purpose Tactical Vehicles, Engineer Construction Equipment, and to include rebuild of major track assemblies.

(2) Wiring and lighting of Maintenance Shops was started on 1 May 1966 and scheduled to be completed on 1 October 1966.

(3) Listed below are Major Items of equipment density and number deadlined for three month period covered by this report. These statistics include 1st Logistical Command Units located at Cam Ranh Bay only.

Major Items Density and Deadline - Monthly Statistics

Item	31 May 1966		30 June 1966		31 July 1966	
	Density	D/L	Density	D/L	Density	D/L
Truck, Cargo 2½ Ton	248	55	302	73	333	89
Truck, 2½ Ton, other	57	11	59	12	84	16
Truck, Tractor, 5 Ton	132	32	120	37	212	46
Truck, 5 Ton, other	119	7	118	16	139	20
Trailer, Semi, 12 Ton S & P	95	1	52	0	142	4
Trailer, Semi, 5000 Gal. Tanker	3	0	9	0	23	0
Worklift, R/T	72	26	72	25	86	29
Forklift, Comm	80	10	68	11	117	23
Generator, Under 5 KW	174	16	163	34	196	35
Generator, 5 to 15 KW	70	28	57	16	51	8
Generator, 15 to 45 KW	16	5	13	5	15	5
Crane	39	18	34	17	36	17
Refrigerator Van	22	7	21	10	30	8
Bakery Units	1	0	1	0	2	0
Laundry Units, Washer	6	1	6	0	13	0
Laundry Units, Dryer	9	0	9	0	13	0
Water Purification Unit	0	0	0	0	1	0
Bath Unit	Not Reported		Not Reported		10	0
Tractor	13	8	15	7	16	4
Crane, Floating	1	0	1	0	1	0
LARCV	37	13	62	9	72	18
LCMS	23	8	23	8	22	12
LCU	12	0	12	2	12	2
Augs, All	2	0	2	0	2	0
Barge, Cargo	Not Reported		8	0	8	0
Barge, Reefer	Not Reported		3	0	3	1
Barge, Tanker	Not Reported		1	0	1	0
Floating Machine Shop	Not Reported		1	0	1	0
Truck, 1/4 Ton	Not Reported		156	7	252	11
Truck, 3/4 Ton	Not Reported		120	18	165	10

Lessons Learned:

Worn Clutches

Type of Equipment: 2½ Ton & 5 Ton Trucks

Discussion: The trucks in the area are forced to plow through deep sand under heavy loads for long hours of continued operation. The clutches under these

conditions fail at a much faster rate than is normally associated with them.

Observation: Asphalt roads and hardstand storage areas will greatly help to reduce this maintenance problem.

CHAPTER VI

DIRECTORATE OF SERVICES

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The Directorate of Services under the COSTAR Configuration requires modifications in order to effectively apply its weight toward a depot's mission during the construction and build-up stage. A considerable, important facet that is frequently neglected in a depot TO&E is the requirement for an engineer to initiate planning actions on construction, material requirements, unit placement, real estate and the innumerable technical requirements during any construction stage.

Upon the split-up of the US Army Depot into the Cam Ranh Bay Depot (Prov) and the Cam Ranh Bay Sub Area Command (Prov), certain missions and responsibilities were not clearly delineated because previous individuals having staff responsibilities within the directorate were moved as a result of the above division. It should follow that the unit providing the personnel and the operational responsibility should look to the respective staff agency for guidance. In two areas, Property Disposal and Bath Operations, missions were not clearly aligned.

SECTION II COMMANDERS RECOMMENDATIONS

Procurement: Fresh fruits and vegetables are available in sufficient quantities to supplement the A-rations for the troops, but the procurement should be decentralized to a point where an ordering officer can buy directly for his unit in his particular area, and the administration be centralized to facilitate processing of receiving reports and prompt payment to vendors. It was found that when the procurement was partially centralized, perishable items required rehandling. The Vietnamese do not have a container sufficiently rigid to prevent crushing of the produce during its transport. A request has been informally sent to Natick for study on a rigid, nesting plastic basket, which could be easily cleaned and would not support fungi. It was further found that the produce is liable to improve, if there is a greater demand than supply. In this fashion, pineapple availability increased 200% in 3 months. More vendors and approved sources are needed to provide competition and spur on production of lettuce type and salad ingredients which are difficult to find. A better method of pick-up is necessary, preferably early in the morning, so that items picked up are field fresh and cool, respiring less and less apt to deteriorate rapidly.

Lessons Learned:

Laundry Contractors

Item: QM laundries do not have sufficient capability to support

both troops and bulk/industrial type laundry. The alternative is to contract laundry service for fatigues, khakis and occasionally sheets.

Discussion: New laundry contractors who bid on contracts frequently have no experience. Procedural problems are encountered in teaching these contractors how laundry must be picked up and accounted for. Delays are frequently encountered due to their trucks being stopped by local authorities over pass and gate privileges all which deters the timeliness of the action. Quality of the laundry is erratic and occasionally the laundry is accompanied by a smell due to soured laundry starch. Constant on-the-spot supervision and continual training is necessary to provide minimum service.

Observation: Pre-planning, pre-training, and trial runs are essential to success.

Field Bakeries ✓ (M-1945)

Item: The M-1945 Mobile Bakery is subject to breakdowns particularly in the molder and belt assembly.

Discussion: These bakeries have been in use for years, are worn and under the heavy production breakdown frequently. In one case the mold hearing has been retooled several times. Sufficient stocks of metal should be brought along so that items could be fabricated. Metal stock is most difficult to find. In other problems electrical hook up must be very carefully scrutinized to prevent shorts and dead leads which cause malfunctions.

Observation: A great deal more training is essential particularly in the maintenance aspects of the M-1945 bakery.

Bad Flour

Item: Flour is generally full of weevils. ✓

Discussion: The standard approach to weeviled flour is sifting. Under field conditions, sifting imparts considerable dust and dirt to the flour particularly when space is limited because it is sifted in the open.

Observation: In a hot humid area of this type, it would seem most feasible to provide flour in 100 pound containers, so that preventive treatment against weevils can be taken by the use nitrogen, or else some ready portable method of fumigation be provided to combat this health hazard.

Pallets

Item: Packing and crating people are principally involved in the building of pallets from precut packaged pallets. Electric driven pneumatic hammers would make the overall operation much more efficient, with less effort involved.

Discussion: The tremendous number of pallets needed is equal to the number of persons working, and the time required for their production is hampering the operation's efficiency. Pneumatic hammers on a production line would immeasurably increase the rate of completion.

Observation: Pneumatic hammers, banding machines and table mounted saws would cut problems in pallet production by 50%.

Ice Cream Production

Item: Prior to an ice cream plant being built, ice cream is provided by machines or by in shipments. Dry ice is required for the transportation and storing of ice cream, during its distribution.

Discussion: In this type of climate ice cream is a highly desirable item, and it also provides a high nutritional content to a soldier, who finds canned milk unacceptable as compared to fresh or recombined milk. The distribution of ice cream machines should be based on an areas anticipated troop strength, and also the ordering party's ability to produce the product. The problem of storing the ice cream is critical during its transportation. To eliminate this problem, a facility to produce dry ice should be provided and insulated carrier bags used.

Observation: Obtaining ice cream machines with a sufficient rate of production and a facility to produce dry ice is essential to the production of ice cream in large quantities, and its distribution. Reefer vans are successfully utilized, in order to store the ice cream, however, dry ice would be more effective because the distribution area is beyond the areas where reefers normally would go.

Gas Generating Operation

Item: Director of Services has assumed the responsibility for the gas generating plant.

Discussion: The Directorate of Services acquired, during this reporting period, the staff supervision of the Gas Generating Plant. This plant, operated by the 67th Engineer Detachment (GI), has the primary mission of generating O₂, N₂, and Acetylene gases. There

are several problems connected with the specific mission of this unit. Of prime consideration, is the physical location of the plant itself, in as much as the explosive hazards peculiar to the plant's operation are ever present. Safety regulations require that the plant must be 7925 feet from ammunition areas. Another problem inherent in the present location is the biproduct of lime in the manufacturing of Acetylene. Being physically located above the non-potable water intake, the lime surplus drains downstream thus contaminating the water point.

Observation: Closer planning and coordination are necessary in establishing a location for such an operation, taking into consideration all facets of the situation including the operational requirements of the plant itself, as well as the neighboring units. The solution has been found by relocating the plant to an area relatively isolated with an abundant water supply, good drainage, and filling all distance requirements.

CHAPTER VII
DIRECTORATE OF AMMUNITION

SECTION I SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. Since occupation of the cantonment area, each unit has succeeded in framing all tents and one unit erected a permanent type orderly-supply room.
2. During the last week of July 1966, the Ammunition Battalion (Prov) Headquarters moved its operation to the Depot area and is presently part of the Cam Ranh Bay Depot.

SECTION II COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Security: Physical security of an ammunition storage area cannot be provided by the ammunition storage companies. At Cam Ranh Bay, 10% of the work force is engaged in security of the ammunition, and still the security is inadequate. A security force must be provided from other than ammunition resources.

SECTION IIIA LESSONS LEARNED

1. Communications: It has been learned that to rely on land line communications between the rear element and the forward support area is not wise. To prevent the requirement for emergency resupplies, the Ammunition Battalion has placed an AN/GRC-46 radio with the forward area for prompt communications before the situation becomes critical. This equipment is available to all classes of supply if necessary.

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

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